

Ex. # 1819 B

Evidentiary Document No. 5333-B

RECORD OF STATEMENT.

KUNITO HATAKEYAMA, (Pages 16-18)

who is Commander, IJN., and attached to the Navy Ministry, whose present address is the Living Quarter of the Yokosuka Naval Station Headquarters, and who was born on March 14th, 1906, made the following statement, of his free will, in the presence of the Prosecutor at the Prosecution Court of the Tokyo General Court Martial on Nov. 8, 1945:

1. "My domicile is 1717 Yano-Machi, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture.

2. "While a Lieutenant of the Navy, I participated in the Arbon Island Occupation Campaign in connection with the Great Pacific War in the capacity of the Adjutant and Senior Officer of the 1 KNSLP. And in those days there happened an incident of the murder of POW on the island.

3. "Before entering into the details of the incident I wish to explain the organization of the Occupation Forces and the general view of the operation. The overall command of the operation was assumed by Major-General ITO, IJA. The forces composed of army troops was used for the capture of the City of Arbon, while naval troops was employed for taking the air field under the command of Rear Admiral HATAKEYAMA, mentioned Commander of the 24 NSBF; the forces placed under his command were-

the 1 KNSLP, one infantry platoon each from the 1st and 2nd Sasebo Naval Special Landing Party, and one army infantry company. The Minesweeping Force consisted of the 21st Minesweeper Division.

"We began our landing of Hitlano (this spelling is not sure) Beach on January 31st, 1942, capturing the airfield on Feb. 3rd. And Admiral HATAKEYAMA hoisted his flag at the Laha Airfield on the 5th of the month. In this operation I took the command of the 1 KNSLP troops due to the fact that Commander HAYASHI had not yet arrived at his post.

"The POW taken at the Laha Airfield during this operation were about 250 of Australian and Dutch troops, and there were besides the above native troops amounting to a considerable number as far as I can recall, though the exact number is uncertain.

"With the creation of the 24 NSBF on Feb. 5, the 1 KNSLP was put under the permanent command of this unit. And if I remember correct, either late in February or in the beginning of March the 1 KNSLP was dissolved to be absorbed intact into the 24 NSBF. Commander HAYASHI, Commander of the 1 KNSLP,

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arrived at his post in Laha around February 7th, and was transferred to other post with the dissolution of the 1 KNSLP.

"Entering into the explanation of the POW murder incident at Laha I am going to state you as follows:

It is recalled it was around the 20th of February that the incident took place. At the court of inquiry I stated that I was away for an operation to clear away guerilla element, leading Mr. NAKAGAWA, a company commander, and others, at the time when this incident occurred. But if Mr. NAKAGAWA stated that he had participated in the incident as the leader on the spot in compliance with the order of Commander HAYASHI which he said to have been transmitted by me, such might be the case. As a matter of fact my memory on the matter is vague because I was exceedingly busy with those affairs such as the clearing up of the battle-fought grounds, the taking over the occupation duties from the army units, the clearing away of guerilla elements, etc. which became necessitated by the situation existing just after the occupation of the area."

(At this juncture the record of the statement by Ken-ichi NAKAGAWA was read to him by the prosecutor.)

3. "I wish to make some statement in connection with what has been read just now. In the composition of the Laha Occupation Forces the artillery unit and the platoon from the 32 Naval Special Base Force were originally a part of the 1 KNSLP, and they had been despatched to Jolo Island till that time; they were merely rejoined to the 1 KNSLP for the operation. According to my memory the Commander of the Laha Detachment was not Chief Warrant Officer SASAKI, but Lieutenant Junior Grade Shoji SAKAMOTO, a special service officer.

"Moreover it must be added that the term the order given by me which was mentioned in the just-now-read NAKAGAWA's statement should mean the order of our commander transmitted by me, because I was then merely the adjutant, and the proper commander had already arrived at his post before the incident happened.

"Besides the above I do not think of anything to state.

When the statement was completed, the record made of it was read to Kunito HATAKEYAMA, who acknowledged the correctness.

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of the record and affixed his signature and seal hereafter.

(The signature and seal of

Kunito HATAKEYAMA)

(Signed by) Tadao NAMBU, Justice Ensign, IJN.,
Recorder, the Tokyo Naval General
Court Martial.

(Signed by) Ichiro ITO, Justice Lt.-Comdr., IJN.,
Prosecutor, the Tokyo Naval General
Court Martial.

Examination of Defendant

(Pages 26-28)

Accused: - Kunito HATAKEYAMA.

On 8th November 1945, at the preliminary examination court of the Tokyo General Court-Martial, Justice Lt. Comdr. Keichoku ONO the preliminary examination officer, in the presence of Justice Ensign Yasuo ABE, the Recorder of the court, examined the above mentioned accused charged with homicide abetment. The questions and answers were as follows:

1. Q. What are your name, date of birth, affiliation, title and rank, domicile, place of birth, present address and occupation before entering navy?
 - A. Name - HATAKEYAMA Kunito.
Date of birth - 14th March 1906.
Affiliation - Attached to Navy Ministry.
Title and rank - Commander of the Navy.
Domicile - 1,717 Yano-Cho, Mi-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture.
Place of birth - same as domicile.
Address - Yaguchi, Kuchida-Mura, Asa-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture.
Occupation before entering navy - Middle school student
2. Q. Court rank, decoration, medals, annuity or pension, if any?
 - A. 6th Court Rank Junior grade (Ju-roku-i), 5th class

order-of-merit (Kun-ga-to), war medal for the 1931-1934 Incident, a Manchukuo Foundation Medal, Medal Commemorating the Showa Coronation, and war medal for the China Affair.

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3. Q. Have you ever/punished for Criminal offenses?
- A. Never.

(Hereupon the preliminary examining officer told the defendant that he would now start questioning him on the aforementioned charge.)

4. Q. The reason why you are suspected of the aforementioned charge is this. What do you say about it?

(Hereupon the preliminary examining officer then read to him the evidence of the crime which is noted down in the "Statement of Opinion", submitted by the Prosecutor ITO to the Navy Minister under date 8 November 1945 and which is mentioned in the Prosecutor's letter under same date requiring this preliminary hearing.)

- A. The number of POW murdered was not so large as is stated in papers just now read to me. According to my recollection the POW killed numbered some 100 to 150. Besides this point I have no other opinion.

5. Q. As I understand, you have stated to the prosecutor in the following way. Is it correct? (With this, the preliminary examining officer read the record of the statement of the accused which has been prepared by the prosecutor.)

- A. It is exactly as you have read just now.

6. Q. What was your relation with Lt. Comdr. NAKAGAWA in the chain of command at the time the case took place?

- A. I was at that time Adjutant to the 1 KNSLP, while Lt.-Comdr. NAKAGAWA was a company commander of our corps. Therefore the orders by the Commander of the Corps, Commander Shojiro HAYASHI, were in some cases transmitted through me, while at other times, they were given direct to NAKAGAWA by our Commander.

7. Q. If that is so, may I understand that you transmitted the Commander's order concerning this case?

- A. As far as I remember now, it was so.

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When the testimony was completed and the record made of it was read again, the defendant stated that it was without mistake so that he was caused to affix his signature and seal below.

(Signed)

Defendant - Kunito HATAKEYAMA (Seal)

(Signed) Yasuo ABE,
Justice Ensign, IJN.,
The Recorder of the Tokyo General
Court-Martial.

(Signed) Keichoku ONO,
Justice Lt.-Comdr., IJN.,
The Preliminary Examination Officer of
the Tokyo General Court-Martial.

At the Preliminary Examination Court of the Tokyo General
Court-Martial,

On 8 November 1945.

THE RECORD OF THE SECOND INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED.

(Pages 119-129)

THE ACCUSED: Kunito HATAKEYAMA.

On the case of the homicidal abetment and aid by the above-mentioned accused the Preliminary-Examination Officer Shinro MATSUKI, a Second Demobilization Official, made the second interrogation of the accused at the Preliminary-Examination Court of the Tokyo General Demobilization Court, on December 24th, 1945, as follows; Yasuo ABE, the Recorder of the Court and a Second Demobilization Official, attending there also:

1. Q. Your name?

A. Kunito HATAKEYAMA.

(Hereupon the examination officer stated that he would proceed to interrogate the accused on the case afore-mentioned.)

2. Q. Is the statement you have made so far all correct?

A. No. I have made some mis-statements, and so I am going to set them right.

3. Q. Regarding the composition of the forces participated in the capture of Arbon Island Ken-ichi NAKAGAWA states like this; what is your opinion about it?

(Hereupon the examination officer read Question No. 3 and its answer from the record of the second interrogation of Ken-ichi NAKAGAWA another accused.) (See No. HNC-38.)

A. Roughly speaking the composition was as is stated by NAKAGAWA, but there are some inaccurate points in his statement; and I will make my statement on these points i.e.

The second platoon and the infantry-gun unit of the 1 KNSLP are not to be considered as the reinforcement from the 32 NSBF, but both of them were attached to the Jolo Detachment, which was really a part of the 1 KNSLP, and were then just made to rejoin with the main body because of Arbon Occupation Operation.

As regards the establishment of the 24 NSBF, NAKAGAWA says that this corps had already been created at the time of the landing on Arbon Island. As a matter of fact, however, at the time of the landing Rear Admiral HATAKEYAMA was still merely an officer attached to the Headquarters of the Third Fleet, though he joined us on board my ship in compliance with a telegraphic order by the fleet headquarters under date of January 29 that "Rear-Admiral HATAKEYAMA shall assume the command of the 1 KNSLP after the landing on Arbon Island"; and though two of his assistants, Commander IEKI and Lieutenant MIZOGUCHI, both also attached to the Third Fleet Headquarters, came to our ship accompanying him, too.

At that time I could not understand clearly enough what was really meant by the words "shall assume the Command of the 1 KNSLP", but I was told by the Admiral that he would command the party in every aspect, and everything was to be reported to him thereafter.

Being the acting commander of the 1 KNSLP since around the 25th of January, I was left to uncertainty about the prospect whether the proper Commander of the 1 KNSLP would newly be appointed or not, because after the arrival of Admiral HATAKEYAMA an information

reached to my ear that the 1 KNSLP would be reorganize into the 24 NSBF and that Admiral HATAKEYAMA would become the commandant of the new unit with Commander IEKI and Lieutenant HIZOGUCHI as his staff officers.

As to the operation of the 21st Minesweeper Division: this division participated in the campaign breaking into the Ambon Bay area independently; the surface fleet which directly cooperated with us in the occupation battle from the open sea was, as a matter of fact, a destroyer division of the Second Destroyer Squadron.

4. Q. Regarding the progress of the Ambon Island Occupation Battle Ken-ichi NAKAGAWA has said like this; do you agree with him?

(Hereupon the Examining Officer read Question No. 4 and the answer from among the record of the second interrogation of the accused Ken-ichi NAKAGAWA.) (See No. HMC-38.)

- A. Roughly, his statement is correct, though I will present you my written statement because his statement is not sufficiently precise in respect of time and some other points.

(Hereupon the accused HATAKEYAMA presented a paper entitled "Summary View of the Course of the Battle fought by the 1 KNSLP in the Capture of the Laha Airfield on Ambon Island," which is annexed at the end of this present record.)

5. Q. Will you explain about the POW taken at the battle of capturing the Laha Airfield?

- A. The POW taken for the first time were some ten Australian soldiers; they were taken by our scouts in the daytime of the 1st of February and were brought in to Sawacord (this spelling is not sure). The second group of the POW numbering about 50 were told to have been captured in the daytime of the Feb. 2 and been brought to Sawacord, though I have no knowledge about the circumstances of the capture because I was then far into the enemy's defense position of the Laha Airfield.

The Third group of the POW numbered about 250, consisting chiefly of Australian troops and of some Dutch soldiers, both of whom were taken on the occasion of the capture of the Laha Airfield early in the morning of February 3rd.

These were the all of the POW taken in the battle for capturing the Laha Airfield.

Q. How were these POW killed?

A. As to the about ten POW taken for the first time by our scouts, I heard that Admiral HATAKEYAMA put them to death early in the morning of February 2nd when he was about to start marching toward the airfield with all his troops. I do not know much about the details of the killing because I was then far into the enemy's position at the airfield. As far as I know the officers remaining at Sowanod at that time were Admiral HATAKEYAMA, Commander IEKI, Lieutenant NIEGUCHI, Ensign SAKAMOTO, Warrant Officer SASAKI, and Warrant Officer SUMA. So far as I was told Rear Admiral HATAKEYAMA had had Ensign SAKAMOTO, Senior Officer present of the 1 KMSLP troops at Sowanod, kill them when his force was about to leave Sowanod for the capture of the airfield, considering it necessary to get rid of the danger to his rear in view of the fact that only a weak force consisting of a medical service unit and a communication unit would be left at Sowanod.

The second group of the POW, about 50 in number, were killed in the following manner: Either on the night of the 3rd of February or on the next day, I don't remember accurately which is correct, a report was forwarded up to the Admiral HATAKEYAMA's headquarters at the Laha Airfield through a despatch rider by Ensign SAKAMOTO, who was then stationed at Sowanod. According to this report the POW were constituting a menace against our unit left at Sowanod which was composed of only one squad of ten guard troops, five or six communication operators, about ten medical corps men and fifty or sixty wounded persons; and this report said the POW, taking advantage of our weakness, behaved rebellious toward the guards, attempted desertions, etc.

At the Laha Airfield, on the other hand, all of our troops numbering about 160 to 170 in all were then occupied by such duties as to keep another group of the POW totalling about 250 under guard, as well as to be alert against any eventuality which were not unliable to occur from outside at such a precarious time as was natural immediately after the capture of the field. It was under these circumstances that Rear-Admiral HATAKEYAMA, who had been already apprehensive of the overall uneasy situation of the area which had been manifesting itself as is written my "Summary View

of the Course of the Battle in the Capture of the Laha Airfield on Ambon Island", called NAKAGAWA, company-commander, and me into his room where Lt. MIZOGUCHI was also present, when he received the aforementioned report by Ensign SAKAMOTO, and ordered us to kill the POW who were assuming menacing attitude at Sowacod. He added also at that time that the killing had to be carried out after careful preparation to insure strict secrecy, and that rifles must not be used because the sound of the firing would have bad effect.

Though I considered, on the one hand, that the absence of the company-commander from the airfield would cause us some anxiety in view of the then precarious defense situation of the field, I was also afraid, on the other hand, lest some unretrievable failure should be made if an unexperienced officer such as a platoon-commander would be entrusted with this killing of the POW which required a considerable carefulness. Therefore I promptly expressed my intention to Admiral HATAKEYAMA that I would have the company-commander administer and supervise this affair personally, and with the approval of the Admiral I so ordered the company-commander NAKAGAWA.

Around 4th or 5th of the month, probably on the 5th if I remember right, the Company-Commander NAKAGAWA reported to me that he had come back from Sowacod having done the killing of the POW there. So I took him to Admiral HATAKEYAMA to have him report the Admiral on the accomplishment of the killing. Though later on I was reported in detail on the conditions of the killing, the vivid and exact picture of the reported detail fails to come up to my memory at present; for I was at that time so much occupied with various other duties including negotiations with the army authorities at Ambon, I was also told at a later date that the troops led by NAKAGAWA for the killing numbered about thirty, though I am not certain which platoon he had picked up the men from. A report was also made to me that the prisoner of the war of the highest rank then killed was a major of the Australian force; of the others none can be recollected to me now.

When we killed the POW for the third time, the victims numbered about 30 out of the about 250 POW in total taken at the time of our capture of the airfield. And this was done also according to the order of Admiral HATAKEYAMA. These 250 POW, when drawn up on a runway on the occasion of the victorious formal

entry of the main body of the Admiral HATAKEYAMA's forces into the airfield, behaved themselves so disturbingly apparently out of their vexatiousness, making tut-tut, clenching their fists, stamping the grounds, and the like, that we were forced to make them quiet and to place them under more strict guard. We also noticed on that night that the POW were talking a secret talk in their barracks without going to sleep as if instituting a mutinous intrigue. And some of them committed desertion taking advantage of the smallness of our guard strength. Furthermore, when we employed them in the work of clearing off debris in the battle-fought areas, we saw in their attitudes something inexcusable, for instance: They behaved as if they were looking down upon our troops, or they were attempting to invite danger to us through misleading us in the handling of bomb-igniters or through keeping the mined place a secret. Moreover, in view of a very uneasy situation of the airfield at that time as is written in my "Summary View of the Course of the Battle in the Capture of the Ambon Island", Admiral HATAKEYAMA had to keep deployed almost all of his forces for the defense of the positions where the surprise by the enemy's remnants was expected; therefore he could employ only insufficient strength for the guard of the POW. There was also some evidence that the POW were exercising contact by the medium of deserters with their comrades remained outside uncaptured.

I think it was the result of the consideration of these circumstances just mentioned as well as of the recollection of the aforementioned mutinous behaviour of the 50 POW at Sownood that Admiral HATAKEYAMA called the Company-Commander and myself on February 5th and ordered us to kill about 30 men who were considered to be especially rebellious out of the about 250 POW billeted in the barracks in the airfield. I in my turn, having decided to have this admiral's order be executed by the Company-Commander himself as before, gave my order to NAKAGAWA to that effect.

On the 6th evening I was reported by the Company-Commander that the killing of the about 50 POW had been finished completely at Tauli as ordered, though I do not know the detailed manner of the killing. All I can remember now was the information then I received to the effect that all of these about 30 POW were Australian with some officers among them.

Next I am going to state about the POW killing committed for the fourth time. For some length of time after the just now mentioned killing of the about 30 POW the rest of the POW behaved themselves quiet and obedient. But since after no more than one platoon strength got left at Laha upon the withdrawal of the main body of the 1 KNSLP to Ambon around February 10th, desertion began to take place again among the POW in course of time. Moreover, it appeared that they were expecting an Allied counter offensive against the region and were preparing for a respondent action to be taken by themselves on such occasions. The fact that some of the deserters dropped back to the camp gave the rise to our suspicion naturally that a sort of secret liaison was being conducted between the POW in the camp and their friends outside. In addition to the above, the POW who were reluctant in their assigned work and showed defiant attitude became increasingly numerous. These changing situations of the POW at Laha were reported to the Commander of the 1 KNSLP at Ambon by the Chief of the Laha Detachment, whose name was, if I remember right, SAKAMOTO, an Ensign.

As is written in the "Summary View of the Course of Battle", the circumstances in Ambon at that time was also in a great precariousness, and the strength available in the city for the defense and guard was so small that it was impossible for us to send reinforcement to Laha even in case of emergency, not to say permanently. It was probably due to this reason that Commander HAYASHI called the Company-Commander NAKAGAWA and me around the 17th or the 18th of February in front of his official room and gave his order directly to the Company Commander to kill the all remaining POW. On the next day the company-commander NAKAGAWA reported me that the killing of all of the remaining POW had been completely done at Tauli; accordingly I reported the same on to Commander HAYASHI.

As for the detailed manner of the kill, I did not hear anything except that swords or bayonets were used instead of rifles in order not to make loud reports. Though I was told that the company-commander took with him the enlisted men quartered in the Victorian Barracks, the number of these men has lost to my memory. In this connection it is recollected that in compliance with the commander's order I told the men employed in the killing never to blab about the matter

for fear this should reach the ears of the POW who were then billeted in Galala.

7. Q. Was the killing of the last POW ordered by Commander HAYASHI?

A. I think Commander HAYASHI ordered this too in accordance with the direction by Admiral HATAKEYAMA.

8. Q. Had the Third Fleet Headquarters been ever asked its opinion regarding the disposition of the POW?

A. As for myself I do not know about the matter of such higher level.

9. Q. How about the POW taken by the army in the case of the Ambon Island Occupation Campaign?

A. The POW taken by the army totalled about 800 including both Australian and Dutch. The 24 NSBF took over from the army around February 12th or 13th the charge of these POW in Galala. And the 24 NSBF in its turn by the oral order through Staff Officer MIZOGUCHI, who then looked after the affairs related to the POW, had the 1 KNSLP take charge of the POW Camp at Galala with the guard of one platoon strength. Accordingly either Warrant Officer SASAKI or Ensign FUKUDA, so far as I can recollect, though I am not sure which of them, was despatched to the POW Camp to assume the guard duty.

As far as I have been told none of these POW was killed.

10. Q. Did you compile any list of the POW captured by the Navy?

A. As I understand the Staff Officer MIZOGUCHI was preparing for it, though nothing was heard about it since then.

11. Q. It is said that about 30 enlisted men belonging to Minesweeper No. 9 then already sunk were included in the men whom Company-Commander NAKAGAWA took with him in the case of the killing of the last group of the POW; do you know about it?

A. I have no knowledge about it.

12. Q. Was it then understood to you that the killing of the POW is prohibited by the international law?

A. Yes. I knew it fully at that time.

13. Q. If you understood it, why do you think the killing was committed?

A. I think the killing was done in the light of the circumstances then existing, i.e. in view of the fact that the surrounding situation was very precarious and that the portent that the POW might mutiny was extremely noticeable, there existed not a small possibility that we ourselves would become of their victim instead if they would be let alone.

When the interrogation of the accused was completed, the record made of it was read to the accused; and as the accused said that it was without any mistakes, he was caused to affix his signature and thumb-print below.

(The signature and thumb-print
of the Accused)

(Signed) Yasuo ABE,
Recorder, Second Demobilization
Ministry.

(Signed) Shinro WATABIKI,
Preliminary Examination Officer,
Second Demobilization Ministry.

At the Preliminary Court of the Tokyo Demobilization Court,
On December 24th, 1945.

The Third Interrogatory of the Accused.

(Pages 324-327)

The Accused - HATAKEYAMA Kunito.

On 12 February 1946, in the third examination in the Court of the Demobilization Ministry in Tokyo, WATABIKI Shinro, SDO Pres. of TGDC in the presence of ABE Yasuo, SDO, Red. of TGDC, continued the examination of HATAKEYAMA Kunito held on the charge of abettor to a murder case. The questions and answers are as follows:

1. Q. What is your name?
A. HATAKEYAMA Kunito.
(Hereupon the examining official told him that he would examine him for the case above-mentioned.)
2. Q. In what capacity were you called to Commandant HATAKEYAMA, when you received the orders to execute the POWs around 5th or 6th of February?
A. As the Commanding Officer, HAYASHI, of 1 KNSLP had not yet arrived at his post on that day, I was called in to receive the orders in the capacity of Acting Commanding officer of 1 KNSLP.
3. Q. In what capacity then, when the orders of the execution of POWs was delivered on about 20 February?
A. The order was directly delivered to the company commander NAKAGAWA Kenichi from the Commanding officer; I was attending there as adjutant. As a rule, orders of the Commanding Officer are to be delivered directly from the Commanding Officer, though sometimes they are given through the adjutant. As adjutant is the assistant to the Commanding Officer, it is necessary for him to be well acquainted with Commanding Officer's policies and intentions in general, so that when an order is given, the adjutant is usually with him, and if not, he is ordinarily told about the order before or after its actual delivery.
4. Q. Did you express any opinion of yours, when the order of the execution was given?
A. I know that the execution of POWs is in principle a violation of international law and also of rules concerning land warfare. So when the Commandant

HATAKEYAMA told me at first his intention that he would kill POW due to their restive attitude, I proposed him to put them under a stricter guard, and then take some other measures afterwards. But Commandant HATAKEYAMA seemed to have been strongly convinced that it would be better to dispatch the POWs at once, because, he was afraid, if he left the matter as it was, there might be chance enough that we ourselves would be annihilated by the rebellious POWs. As for me, I took it for granted to obey the Commandant since my advice had once been denied; this thought of mine, moreover, had been strengthened through my experiences during the war.

Again, about 20 February, when I was summoned to the Commanding Officer HAYASHI, before the order of execution was given, I told my opinion as before, and I think the Commanding Officer himself advised the Commandant regarding the illegality of the execution of POWs.

But it seems that the Admiral had been determined to act according to his own conviction in view of the general affairs on the island of Ambon and the rebellious atmosphere among the POWs. And the order was eventually delivered from the Commanding Officer HAYASHI.

5. Q. Is it true that the Company Commander NAKAGAWA also stated his views when he was given the order of execution from the commanding officer HAYASHI around 20 February?

A. Yes, I remember, he did.

6. Q. Does the defendant think that the superior's order should be obeyed, even when the order is clearly unlawful?

A. It is very difficult to decide whether the order is unlawful or not; it depends upon the differences of the quality of culture and opinions between the commander and his subordinate. If the order is construed to be plainly against the law, the subordinate may state his own opinion about it; but when the commander insists upon carrying out his order, the subordinate should obey, I think.

Of course, it may sometimes happen that the subordinate purposely disobeys the commander's order and acts otherwise, but in this case he does so upon his own responsibility, considering the situation in general.

7. Q. Is the defendant's career truthfully represented in this curriculum vitae of yours?

(Hereupon the examining official read to the defendant the copy of the curriculum vitae of the defendant that had been forwarded from the Chief of Personnel Bureau of Navy Ministry.)

- A. There are no mistakes.

By the way, before I was admitted to the Naval College I had finished Kōryō Middle School of Hiroshima City in March 1925.

8. Q. How about your domestic affairs?

- A. Wife Suzuko (33 years), daughter Yōko (12 years) and son Tadakuni (5 years); we have no other property except about 7,000 yen on deposit.

9. Q. How is your state of mind at present?

- A. It seems to me that the general situation in those days was the principal factor for Rear-Admiral Hatakeyama, the Commandant, to determine upon the execution of POWs, in order to prevent the untoward accident; and I think that the commandant was compelled to take such measures; maybe he could do otherwise in such a psychological crisis he was confronted with. But it is truly regrettable that he did not accept my opinion about the matter, and at the same time I feel an extreme pity for those POWs who lost their precious lives through the execution, I can't help praying for the repose of their souls from the bottom of my heart.

(Hereupon the examining official told the defendant about the grounds upon which the defendant was held in suspicion, and that the defendant could plead his case if he would, but the defendant said that he had no plea to offer.)

10. Q. Have you anything else to say?

- A. No, I have nothing else to say in particular.

When the testimony was completed, the record made of it was read again; and as Hatakeyama said that it was without

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any mistakes he was caused to affix his signature and seal below.

The Accused

HATAKEYAMA Kunito (Signed)

(Signed) ABE Yasuo, SDO, Red, TGDC.
Clerk, Second Demobilization Ministry.

(Signed) WATABIKE Shinro, SDO, Pop. TGDC.
Examining Official
Second Demobilization Ministry.

At the same court as above, 12 February 1946.

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17.

any mistakes he was caused to affix his signature and seal below.

The Accused

HATAKEYAMA Kunito (Signed)

(Signed) ABE Yasuo, SDO, Red, TGDC.
Clerk, Second Demobilization Ministry.

(Signed) WATABIKE Shinro, SDO, Pop. TGDC.
Examining Official
Second Demobilization Ministry.

At the same court as above, 12 February 1946.

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聴取書

横須賀鎮守府庁舎内

海軍省出仕

海軍中佐

島山國登

明治三十九年三月十四日生

右之者昭和二十年十一月八日東京軍法會議
察正ニ於テ檢察官ニ對シ任意に、通り陳述ヲ爲
シタリ

- 一、私、本籍、廣島縣安藝郡今野町千七百十
六番地ニアリマス
- 二、私ハ嘗テ海軍大尉當時今 大東亞戦争
ニ際シ、一特別官（芝佐將校）トシテ、ア、ボ、
島攻略作戰ニ参加シマスガ當時同島ニ於テ
信濃丸沈没事件ガアリマス其、状況ヲ申
上ゲルニ前ニ當時、部隊、編成ニ戰闘經過
概略ヲ申上ゲルト同島攻略作戰、伊藤陸軍
少將全般、指揮ニ當リ陸軍部隊ハ、ア、ボ、
島攻略ニ向ヘ海軍部隊ハ飛行場攻略ニ當リ
其、指揮官ハ、一特報司令官ニ定者タル
島山海軍少將トシテ、ア、ボ、一特佐、一、二特、各
一、一小隊陸軍部隊トシマス、一掃海部隊ハ
一掃海隊トシマス
- 昭和十七年一月三十一日ヒトシニ上陸開始ニ
三月ハ飛行場占領四月五日島山少將ハ、

REFUS TO COOPERATE

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2

飛行場ニ將旗ヲ掲ゲラシメシタ 當時新司令
林中佐未着任、爲メトテ一時、指揮官トシテ
本作戦ニ當リマシタ 同作戦ニ於テ「飛行
場ニ於ケル敵信房」露洲和蘭軍約二百
五十名ヲ其、他ニ土民兵ヲ數ハ判然トシマセ又ガ
相音信教アツタ様ニ記憶シテ居リマス

二十四特根、二月五日編成セラシマシタ又ガ呉一
時、其、儘 其ノ指揮下ニアリマシテ二月下旬カ
又、三月上旬ト思ヒマスガ呉一時ガ解散セシ
其、儘二十四特根ニ編入セラシタニアリマス。

呉一時、司令林中佐ハ二月七日頃 アニホニ
着任セシトガ一時解散ト共ニ他ニ轉出致シテ
居リマス

「」ニ於ケル信房殺害事件ニ付キマス、
二月二十日前後、事ト記憶シマスガ、私ハ査閲、
際ニ、私ガ中川中隊長以下ヲ引連シ既定作戦
ノ爲メ不在中其、處分ガアツタ様ニ中トデマシ
タガ中川中隊長ガ其、處分ニ付私カウ林司令
ノ命令傳達ニ依リ現場指揮官トシテ其、
處令ニ關係シタト述ベテ居ルト致シマス、其
ノ様ナ事ガアツタカニ知シマセ又ガ當時ハ占領
直後、事デアリ戦場ノ整理、陸軍部隊ト
引継既定作戦等極メニ多忙デアリマシタ
テ私ノ記憶ニ於テ判然トシタ事ハ申シテカネエ

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2

飛行場ニ將旗ヲ掲ゲテシメシタ 當時私ハ司令
林中佐末着任、爲メトテ一特、指揮官トシテ
本作戦ニ當リテシタ 同作戦ニ於テ「飛行
場ニ於ケル 敵機部隊ハ、遠洲、和蘭軍約二百
五十名ヲ其、他ニ土民兵ヲ數ハ判然トシメセ又ガ
相言明テアツタ様ニ記憶シテ居リマス

二十四特根ハ二月五日編成セテシメシタ又ガ呉一
特ハ其、儘 其ノ指揮下ニアリマシテ二月下旬カ
又ハ三月上旬ト思ヒマスガ呉一特ガ解散セシ
其、儘二十四特根ニ編入セシメタニアリマス。

呉一特ノ司令林中佐ハ二月七日頃 アニホニ
着任セシタ 呉一特解散ト共ニ他ニ轉出致シテ
居リマス

「」ニ於ケル信屬殺害事件ニ付キマス、
二月二十日前後ノ事ト記憶シマスガ、私ハ査閲、
際ニハ私ガ中川中隊長以下ヲ引連シ既定作戦
ノ爲メ不在中其、處令ガアツタ様ニ中トナリ
タガ中川中隊長ガ其、處令ニ付私カラ林司令
ノ命令傳達ニ依リ現場指揮官トシテ其、
處令ニ關係シタト述ベテ居ルト致シマス、其
ノ様ナ事ガアツタカニ知シメセ又ガ當時ハ上領
直後ノ事デアリ 戦場ノ整理、陸軍部隊ト
引継既定作戦等極メニ多忙デアリマシタ
テ私ノ記憶ニ於テ判然トシタ事ハ申シテカネエ

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此ノ時檢察官ハ中川建一ニ對スル聽取書ヲ
讀南ケケリ

一、只今御讀聞ケ、事ニ就キマシテ、「つ」攻略
部隊、編成中三十二特報、砲隊及一ヶ小隊、
元々兵一特、一部ニアリマス。「ホ」島ニ派遣セ
シテ居ケ、復歸セシメタメ、事ニアリマス
「つ」派遣隊長ニ就キマシテ、私ノ記憶デハ
佐々木兵曹長デ、十ヶ特務中尉阪本正ニテ
アツタ様ニ記憶シテ居リマス。


尚只今御讀聞ケ、中川、調書中、私ノ命令
ト云フ言葉アガリマスガ、私ハ當時副官デ、二
司令着任後、事ニアリマス、二司令、命令
傳達ノ意味、モ、ニアリマス

其ノ他別ニ申シケル事ニアリマス

右讀聞ケタニ度相違ナキコト申述ベシニ署
長捺印セリ

白山國登(印)

前同日前記場所ニ於テ



東京海軍法會議

海軍法務少尉 南部忠之(印)

檢察官海軍法務少佐

伊藤一郎(印)

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被告人訊問調書

被告人 白田山國 登

右殺人幫助 被告事件ニ付 昭和二十年十一月

八日東京軍法會議議決審官海軍法務少佐

小野敏直、録事海軍法務少將 阿部保

田力立會、上被告人ニ對シ 訊問ヲ爲スニト

左、如シ

一 問 氏名、生年月日、所屬部隊、官職等級、

本籍、出生地、住居、入籍前、職業、如何

答 氏名、 白田山國 登

生年月日、 明治三十九年三月十四日生

所屬部隊、 海軍 省

官職等級、 海軍 中佐

本 籍、 廣島縣安藝郡竹野町
千七百十七番地

出生地、 本籍地ニ同シ

住 居、 廣島縣安佐郡口田村字矢口
入籍前、職業、 中學生

二 問

答

位記、勳章、記章、年金、恩給、有否ヤ

從六位勳五等 昭和六年乃至九年 市憲從軍

記章、滿洲國建國廟記念章 昭和

大正記念章 支那事變從軍記章

等ヲ有スニ居リス

4

三 問

答

刑事上、處命ヲ受ケタ、コトニ付カ

アリマセヌ

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於茲豫審官、被告人ニ對し前記被告事件ニ付
訊問スルニ曰フ生レタリ

四、問、被告人、嫌疑ヲ受ケタル内容、斯様ニナリ
居レガ如何

於茲豫審官、豫審請求書ニ據用、檢察官
意見書記載ノ犯罪事實ヲ讀聞ケタリ

答、只今御讀聞ケノ内容中殺害シタ偽造
ノ數ハソレ程多ク、ナク自分、記憶デハ百名カ
百五十名位ニアッタと思ヒマス 其ノ他ニ就
テハ意見見ハアリマセヌ

五、問、被告人、檢察官ニ對シ斯様ニ申述ベテ
居ル様ガ如何

於茲豫審官、被告人ニ對スル檢察官、聴取
書ヲ讀聞ケタリ

答、只今御讀聞ケノ通り事實ニ相違アリマセヌ

六、問、本件當時ニ於ケル中川少佐ト被告人
ト、命令關係如何

答、自分ハ當時ニ第一特機陸戰隊、副官
ヲシテ居リ中川少佐ハ中隊隊長ヲシテ居
リマシタ 終ッテ同隊司令、林銑次郎
中佐、命令ハ私ヲ通シテ中川ニ達セシメ事
モアリ直接司令ヨリ達セシメタ事モアリマシタ
様ナ關係ニナツテ居リマシタ

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
大岡 然るに本件は林忠佐、命令で傳達して
實行せしむ事ニナシニ居ルカ
答 只今、自分ノ記憶ニテ居ニ限リテ、左様
ニナシニ居ルと思ハス
左 讀聞ケタル處相違ナキ旨ヲ申述ベク
ヲ以テ左ニ署名捺印セシム

破生人 白田少輔登(白田)

前同日前記場所ニ於テ

東京軍法會議

録事海軍法務少尉



豫審官

海軍法務少佐

阿部 保田(阿部)

小 野 敬 直 (印)

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大岡 然るに本件は林生佐、命令を傳達して
實行せしむ事ニナシニ居ルカ
答 只今、自分ノ記憶して居る限りに左様
ニナシニ居ルと思ひマス
左讀聞ケタル處相違ナキ旨ヲ申し述べタル
ヲ以テ左ニ署名捺印セラル

秘生人 白田少輔登(阿)

前日目前記場所ニ於テ

東京軍法會議

録事海軍法務少尉

東京
軍法
會議
之
日
記

豫審官

海軍法務少佐

阿部 保田(阿)

小 野 敬 直 印

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第三回被告人訊問調書

被告人

白田山國登

右ノ者ニ對スル殺人助弔被告事件ニ付昭和二十
年十二月二十五日東京復員裁判所豫審達ニ
於テ豫審官オ二復員官郷引紳郎ノ録事
オ二復員官阿部保田主會ノ上被告人ニ對シ
前面ニ引續キ訊問ヲ爲スコト左ノ如シ
一、問 氏名、

答 白田山國登

於茲豫審官ノ前記被告事件ニ付訊問
ヲ爲スコト生ケタリ

二、問 是迄申述べタ事ノ相違ナラカ

答 事實ト相違シタ事アリマス、テ只今

カハ是等ノ上大テ訂正致シマス

三、問 アニボノ島攻略ニ參加シタ部隊ノ編成

ニ付中川建一ノ斯様ニ述ベニ居ルカモ何

此ノ時豫審官、被告人中川建一ニ對スルオ二
四回訊問調書中オ二問答ヲ讀聞ケタリ

答 大体中川ノ述ベニ居ル通りデアリマスカ

其ノ中若干違ツテ居ル上大テ申上ケマス

呉一特、第三ノ隊乃チ兵砲隊、三十二特
根カハ派遣サシタモノテ、ナク此ノ兩隊トモ

本来呉一特、ホロ派遣隊ニ所屬シテ居
ルモノデアニボノ島攻略戦闘ノ爲ニ呼返
シタモノデアリマス

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for

又二十四特根ニ付、中川ハアニボン島上陸當時既ニ
 編成サシ居ッタ様ニ申シ居リマスカ白山少将
 ハ夫道ヲ三艦隊司令部附デアリマシタカ一月
 二十九日同艦隊ヨリ「白山少将ハアニボン島上陸
 後呉一特ヲ指揮スベシ」トノ電命ヲ受ケ同
 艦隊司令部附、家老中佐乃溝口大尉、二人
 カ其ノ輔佐官ト爲リ、私、船ニ來ラシタモノデアリマス
 其、際「呉一特ヲ指揮スベシ」ト云フ意味カ良ク
 判リマセヌデシタカ白山少将ヨリ萬事ニ付ニ指
 揮スベシト自分ノ意ニ云ツテ来イト云ハシテ居リマス
 尙、一月二十五日頃カ「呉一特」司令代理ヲ致シテ
 居リマスカ白山少将カ来リシ「アニボン」
 占領後、呉一特、二十四特根ニ編成替日ニナリテ
 白山少将カ其ノ司令官、家老中佐、溝口大尉カ
 參謀ニナリト云フ話モ聞クテ居リマス、終ニテ
 當時、呉一特、司令カ新ニ着任セリシカ何ウカ
 ト云フ事モ判然ニシタカ、デアリマス
 次ニ三十一掃海隊ハアニボン灣カニ侵入シタモノ、
 直接我々ト共ニ海上カ「攻略戰」ニ參加シタ、
 オニ水雷戰隊中、駆逐隊デアリマス
 四、問「アニボン島攻略戰」經過ニ付中川建一
 ハ斯様ニ述ベテ居ルカ如何
 八、此、時、豫審官、補充人、中川建一ニ對スルニ、
 訊問調書、中、第四問答ヲ讀聞ケタリ、

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答 大体、其を述べてアリスカ時間、其等餘リ
正確デナイ處モアリスカヲ私ノ記憶ニ基ク
モノヲ書イテ差ニ上ケマス

此、時被其ノ人、吳一特ア・ボニ島ニハ飛行場攻略戦
闘経過概要ト題スル書面ヲ提出シタルヲ以テ本調
書ノ末尾ニ添付ス

五問 ラハ飛行場攻略戦闘ニ於テ得タ敵俘虏
ノ状況ニ付申述ベヨ

答 第一回ハ二月一日ノ書問、我々候カ濠洲軍
ノ俘虏約十名ヲ捕ヘテソコトニ連行シ
テ來ミタ

第二回ハ二月二日昼間約五十名ヲ捕ヘテ
ソコトニ連行シタルト云フ事ヲ聞キミタ
當時私ハラハ飛行場ノ敵陣地内ニ侵入シテ
居リミタノテ其ノ捕ヘタ時ノ状況等ハ知
リマセヌ

第三回ハ二月三日早朝ラハ飛行場侵入占領
ノ際、濠洲軍ヲ主トシテ若干ノ和蘭軍ヲ合
メタ合戦約二百五十名ノ俘虏ヲ得ミタ
以上ガラハ飛行場攻略戦闘ニ於テ得タ敵
俘虏ノ全部ニアリス

9 六問 之等ノ俘虏ハ如何ニ處分シタカ

答 第一回、我々候、捕ヘテ來タ約十名ノ俘
虏ハ二月二日早朝白山少将カ全力ヲ率

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其テ飛行場攻撃ニ向テ際、處令セシタト云フ
事ヲ聞キマシタ其、際、私ハ既ニ同飛行場、
敵陣地ニ侵入シテ居リマシタノテ處令、詳シイ
状況ハ知リマセヌ 其、際、ソフコードニ残ッテ
居タ者、中、私、知ッテ居ル、准士官以上、白田
山少将、坂本少尉、佐々木
兵曹長、諏訪兵曹長等ニアリマシタ信務
、處令、私、聞イタ所テ、白田山少将カ飛行
場進撃ニ際シ、ソフコードニ、醫務隊通信隊
ニカ残留シ、イ自係上後方、不安ヲ除ク爲
ニソフコードニ居タ兵一、先任者坂本少尉
ニ命ジテ之ヲ處令サセタト云フ事ニアリマス
オ二回目、約五十名ノ信務、二月二日夜、四
カ良ク記憶シテ居リマセヌカ當時ソフコード
ニ残留シテ居タ坂本少尉カ、ソフ飛行場ニ
居リマシタ白田山少将、許ニ傳令ニ依リ報告カ
参リソレニ依リマスト當時ソフコードニ残ッテ居
タノ、負傷者五、六十名、醫務隊約十名、通
信隊五、六名、警戒兵一、令隊約十名、ミニア
ルニ對シ、夫等、信務カ警戒兵ニ對シ、反抗
的態度ヲ示シタリ、逃走者カ出タリ、不穩ナ
状態ヲ示シテ居ルト云フ事ニアリマス、一方、
「飛行場」ニ於テモ味方、全兵力百六七十名、
以テ、直後、周囲ニ對スル不安モアリ、約二百

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五十名、信濃、警戒ニ當リテ居リ只今差出シ
ニタアニホニ島ニ飛行場攻略戦闘經過概
要中ニ記載致シテ置キマシタ様ナ四周、不安、
状態ニ加ヘ此等、信濃カ反乱ノ氣勢ヲ示
シマシタノテ白山少將、自今ノ部屋ヲ私トシ中川
中隊長ヲ呼ビ其ノ場ニ溝口大尉モ居リマシタ
カ同少將、ソノコト、信濃カ不穩ノ情勢ヲ
示シテ居ルト云フ報告カ來タカニ處令ニテ仕舞
ヘト命セシ尙其、際外部ニ判ニ又様ニ良ク
準備シテヤ、銃ノ旨カ不レカ、使、又様ニト云ハ
シタノテ私、喜田時中隊長ヲ飛行場、外、出ス
事、飛行場周辺、警戒ニ若干ノ不安モアリ
ミシタカ信濃ノ處令、相當ニ慎重ヲ要スル事
ニアリト中隊長ナドニ命シテヘマシタト困ルト思
ヒマシタノテ其、場ニ白山少將ニ對シ中隊長ヲ
シテ直接指揮監督シ之ヲ實施セシメ、後同
申出テ同少將、承諾ヲ得テ之ヲ中川中隊長ニ
命シマシタ

ソレニ四日又五日頃多分五日ト記憶シマスカ中川中
隊長、ソノワートニ赴キ信濃ヲ處令シテ來タリ日
利ニ報告セガアリマシタカ私、中川中隊長ト共ニ
白山少將、處ニ参リ同中隊長ヲシテ處令終了
ノ日報告セシメマシタ當時利、陸軍ト連絡、
為アニホニ市、方ニ行ハタリ來タリテ居タニ處令際、

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計之イ極様ニ付モ其、後報告カアツタ、何カ只今判然ニ記
憶ニシテ居リマシ、又中川中隊長、率キテ行ニタリ、後テ聞
イタ所ニ依リ、三十名位ニアリト云フ事アリマシ、何處、ト隊
ヲ連シテ行ニタリ判然ニシマシ。
又其、際處令ニシテ、先住者、濠洲軍、ト左ニアリト聞
キマシ、其、他、事、記憶ニシテ居リマシ。
第三、飛行場占領、際捕ヘル約二百五十名、中約三十名
、處令ニ自山少將ヨリ命ニシタリ、テアリマシ、此、約二百五十
名、俘虜、自山少將、率キタル味方、主カ、飛行場、軍艦旗
ヲ樹テ、入場スル際、滑走路ニ整列セシメ、此、處、我兵カ、
非處ニ居、ト非處、カ、テ居ル、ヲ見テ、結果、思ヒマシカ
、台打テ、ミタリ、テ、握リ、足ヲ踏ミ、鳴ラシタリ、テ、殘念相
態度ヲ示シテ、騷キ出シタリ、テ、之、制止シ、上ニ一層警戒、嚴
ニシタ事アリマシ、又其、夜、俘虜、處、兵舎、中、睡眠セ
スニ反抗、爲ニ密議ヲシテ、居様、氣配ヲ見エ、ミ、更ニ、
上ニ警戒兵、手薄ニ采ニテ、逃走スル者ヲ見マシ、
尚、戦場整理ニ俘虜、使、際、味方、兵隊ニ對シ、侮辱
スル様、態度ヲ示シ、タリ、爆彈、發火、全、取扱、誤、ミ、マシ、
味方ニ損害ヲ與ヘ、様トスル様、態度ヲ見、上ニ更ニ地雷、敷
設箇所ヲ教ヘ、テ、テ、故意ニ、危害ヲ企テ、タリ、ミ、シ、タ、高、高
時、狀況、予、ホ、ニ、攻、略、戰、闘、經、過、概、要、中、ニ、記載、シ、置
キ、ミ、タリ、甚、タ、不、安、ノ、狀況、ニ、アリ、ミ、タリ、自山少將、居、時
飛行場、狀況トシテ、敗殘兵、未、龍、スル、處、アル、地、兵、ニ、警
戒兵ヲ配スルニ、手一杯、テ、俘虜、警戒、不、十、分、テ、アリ、俘虜

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カ逃走ニテ敗殘兵ト連絡ニテ居ル形跡モアリ一オソワコードニ居
タ約五十名、俘虜カ反乱、氣配ヲホシタ狀況トテ照ニ合ニ
シテ結果ト思ヒマコカ五日ニ私ト中隊長ヲ呼ビ飛行場、兵
舎ニ收容カシテ居ル約三百五十名ノ俘虜、中特ニ甚シク反乱
能ハズトモスモト認メタリタ約三十名ヲ處令シテ仕舞ヘト命
セシメニタノテ私、前ト同様中隊長自ラ其、実行ニ當ラセシ事
トニ其、旨中川中隊長ニ命ジタ、テアリニ
其、翌六日タ亦同中隊長カ其、俘虜約三十名ヲ「タカリ」
テ完全ニ處令ニタト云フ報告ヲ受ケニタ處令、丹波等
ニ矢張り詳シテ事、利リマセヌ此、約三十名、濠洲軍、ニテ
將校モ混ニテ居ルト聞イタ様ニ記憶ニテ居リニ
次ニ第四回目、俘虜、處令ニ付テ申上トニ
只今申上ニシタ様ニ約三十名、俘虜ヲ處令ニタ、テ暫ク
ハ残リ、俘虜ニ溫順ニシテ居リマシタリ二月十日前後ニ二
十四特撮及兵一特、主カラマシホニ引揚ケタ後ニハニハ
僅カ一隊ニカ残留ニテ居リマシタニタ、テ次第ニ俘
虜、中カラ逃走者ヲ本始メ其、上近ク聯合軍カ反攻ニ兼
(以下次頁)

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ト云フ様ナ態度ヲ示シ、若シ及攻ミテ来タ場合ニ之ヲ
應スルハ氣配の見又逃走シテ俘虜ヲ歸シテ来
ルヲ何モ外部ト連絡シテ受テ様ナ様子ヲ下リ其
ノ上次第ニ作業ヲ怠様ニテ及抗的態度假ヲ下
者々次オエホテ来ミテ之等ノ状況ヲタリ、坂本ヲ
尉ト記憶シタル當時、ラハ派遣隊長のフアゴロ、
吳一特司令ニ報告シテ来リタル

當時フアゴロニ於テ本目提出、戦争經過概要
ニ記載シテ通リ、四週状況甚ハ憂慮スベキ状況
アリ然レニ敬言戒上カ、甚ハ寡クハ、其ノ兵ヲ割
リ奪ニ行カス又危急、降ニ直ニ應振ニ行ノ事モ
来ミ様ナ状況ニ下リタルヲ思ヒ、三月十七日頃
林司令ヲ司令室ニ前テ私ト中川中隊長ニ呼ビ、司
令ヲ直達中川中隊長ニ對シテ全部、俘虜、處
分ヲ命ゼリタルヲ云

其翌日中川中隊長カフタリシニ於テ残リ、俘虜全
部、處分ヲ済ミタルヲ云フ報告アリタルヲ私カ
更ニ司令ニ其ノ旨申上テタル

此時、處分、状況ニ付キ、音ヲミテ、局銃、使用セ
カ、又、銃剣、依リ殺害シタルヲ云フ、以テ私ハ詳ニ
事ヲ聞キテ居タルモ、尙中隊長カ、此時、ビトリヤ兵舎
ニ居テ下士官兵ヲ連シテ行ツタリ、ハ聞キタルハ、名位
テ下リタル記憶ニテ居リタルモ、其、際、司令カ、指示セ
テ待テ、此、事カ、當時、カ、收容セテ居テ、俘虜ニ知

11. 7

~~2/12~~

同日，停戰，雙方降中川中隊長引率，

薄口冬造り作成にて居り様テアリヌの其、後何
うなり知アヌ

10.

海軍創立得リ信曆付信曆名簿作成

由之等、侯爵中ニハ殿ふかりや一人を居すかつ
ク様ニ聞きたるに

于信慶收容所，啟戒 = 中三郎、三

信濃收容所、警戒ニ云々ニ云々、佐々木兵
曹長カ福田少尉カ判然ニ云々カ一ケテ隊ヲ派遣シ

受ケ當時停廢陰停事務ヲ擔カシテ君厚薄口
冬謀ヲ吳一待ニ對シテ一々十隊ヲ派遣シテカラテ、

陸軍使に件々仔細に豫備軍令を合計して署名
二月十三日頃から二夜に陸軍より書翰が引継

丁未之島攻略戰斗於千島軍側を得て俘虜如何

傳廣廣多三降下天第三願陽言令計三其、竟
獨同ヲ訊ネリ事ノ上ニカ

[illegible]

最後、信吾、處分、林司令之ヲ命メ、

以上是「カント」から「実行」の「者」對しての外文
註曰「カント」は「意」を「行」に「對」す

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第三回被告人訊問調書

被告人 白土國登

右者ニ対スル殺人部中助被告事件ニ付昭和二十一年二月十二日東京復員裁判所審判官第二復員官阿部保男之會ノ上被告人ニ對シ前同ニ引續キ訊問ス爲スコト左ノ如シ

一問 氏名

答 白土國登

於茲該審官ノ前記被告事件ニ付訊問ス爲スコトナリ

二問 被告人ニ二月五日頃及六日頃佐藤慶介ノ命令ニ應ジ白土司令官ヨリ達セラルル時如何ナル資格ヲ司令官ニ呼ビラスカ

答 其際ニ與一特ノ林司令カ來タ着任者ニアリタルニ私ニ與一特ノ司令代理トシテ呼ビ命令ヲ達セラルルニアラス

三問 二月二十日頃佐藤慶介ノ命令ニ林司令ヨリ達セラルル時如何

答 其際ノ命令ニ司令ヨリ中川中隊長ニ直接達セラルルニアラスカ私ノ副官トシテ之ニ立會タルニアラス

勿論司令カハ命令ニ司令カ直達ナリシカ然則當時ニ副官トシテ傳達セラルルニ非ニアラス

又副官ニ司令ノ補佐トシ司令ノ方針

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for

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意圖ト云フ様ナモノヲ合衆的ニ知ラテ居ル必要
カアリマス、ニ命令ヲ下サレタル之ニ立會ハカリ
又立會ニサレ協合ハ下令前後同命令ヨリ話カレ
ノカ普通ニアリマス

四問 僞虜方處分ノ命令カアツタ際ニ被害ノ人
ノ意見ヲ目下申シタル事カアツタカ

答 僞虜方ニ處分スル事、國際法上又ハ陸戰
法規ノ上カウモ原則トシテ違法ニアラズ、
私モ知ラテ居リマス、テ最初白山司令官
ヨリ僞虜方ニ反乱ノ狀態カアリニテ處分
テノ仕舞外ハウト云ハシヌ時ニ私、僞虜方、監
視狀態ヲ一層嚴重ニシテ他ニ方策ヲ考
ヘテハ何ウニスカリ意見ヲ申述シタル事アリマス
其、際白山司令官、若シ抛ラテ置クテ此
カ反對ニヤコトニ様ナ事ニナシタル共、時、既ニ
手遅シタ、今ノ中ニ斷乎處分ヲ仕舞ヘト
云フ決意カ非常ニ堅カク様ニアリマス
私トシテハ一應意見ヲ目下申シテ、シガ採用
サラス命令トシテ下サツタ、其、命令ニ
絶対服従スベキモノト思フテ居リマス、
時ニ戰爭中ニ於テ此ノ感、深クニ居リタ
様ナ決意ニアリマス

又二月二十日頃、處分命令カアト前ニ林司
令カヲ呼ビタル時モ同様ニ私、意見ヲ申上
ク又林司令モ此ノ事ヲ命令白山司令官

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ニモ通シテ、ト田ヒマスカ同司令官、(昔時、下ノ
ホノ島ニ於テ)一般狀態、信譽ノ反乱、氣勢カ寧
テ考慮サシタ上、斯ニ處分スル事ニ決意サシタ
結果結局、林司令カ、此ノ命令カ出サシタモ、ト
田ヒマス

五問 中川中隊長モ二月二十日頃、林司令ヨリ信
信カ處分ノ命令ヲ受ケタ際、一應之ニ對シ
意見ヲ目下申シタトノ事、タカ如何

答 其ノ様ナ事カアツタ様ニ記憶シテ居リス

六問 被害人に上官ノ命令ナツテ明ニ不法ナ
命令タト云フ事カ判ツテ居ニモ部下
ハ之ニ従フヘキモノデアルト思フカ

答 命令カ正シムカ何ヤカト云フ事ハ命令
者ト服従者、平等ナ、修養見識、上下
テ判断、仰ク困難ニアリマス、ソシテ
明ニ不法ト思フタ時ニハ意見ヲ目下申
スル譯ニアリマスカリ、モ尚命令サレ
場合ニハ之ニ服従スヘキモノト思フテ居リス
勿論、其ノ時ノ各壇ノ情況ニ依リテハ
命令ト雖モ之ニ従ハサル爲、責任ヲ自命
ナ令親ルル云フ決意、下ニ命令ニ従ハス
他ニ手段ヲ講グル場合モアリマス

19 七問 被害人ノ経験ハ此ノ履歴書に記載、
通リ相違ナイカ

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此時該審官、海軍省人事を長官に交付し、被
告人に対する履歴書寫を認問せり

答、御質問々、通り相違ありませ又

尚海軍兵學校へ入学前、経歴として大正
十四年三月廣島市廣陵中學校より卒業
して居りませ

八問、家庭事情は如何

答、和算の父は、妻三子あり(昭和二十二年)に父
喪(昭和十二年)長男也國(昭和五年)に父
財主として、貯金約七千円、外不動産
所有ありませ又

九問、現在心境は如何

答、本件係廣力上陸令、當時、四國、不協情
勢に對する危険防止、爲田山少將の指揮
官としてノ責任に斯く、女中決意を爲した
モノト當時、同少將、心理上已に苦痛を感ぜ
しと思はるゝに、其陰謀、廣力意見も容れ
しに、かつ事ヲ遺憾に感ぜし、其に本處令
に依り、今ヲ失はるゝ多数の犠牲を計り、
詢に氣、毒々然事ヲ行はるゝに、其に異議を
申し、爲強きモノカアにこそ

於茲該審官、被告に對し、本件嫌疑

ヲ受けたる理由、其に辯解、答へり

告々々々ニ被告に對し、辯解を許さるゝ

十問、他に申述べし事あるか

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答 別段申上ぐに事ハアリマシ又

右讀聞ぐに處相違ハナリ申述ミタリ
以テ左ニ署名捺印セシム

被告人 日田山國登

前同日前記場所ニ於テ
東京後員裁判所

録事第二後員官

阿部 保田力

阿部

秘書官

第二後員官

細引 細郎

細郎